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[1381] 
Thank You, Servicemember! But Your Process 
Is in Another Forum: The Misuse of Civilian 
Jurisprudence to Inform UCMJ Rights 
Justin Biolo* 
Congress codified many of the disciplinary procedural rights for servicemembers in the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). Several of these explicit, statutory 
protections were later developed as judicial doctrines for civilians, such as Miranda’s 
right against self-incrimination and Kastigar’s right to testimonial immunity. In response 
the military’s highest court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, adopted the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to inform a servicemember’s statutory rights under 
the UCMJ. But in doing so, military justice did not recognize that civilian rights are 
typically only invoked in trials while military discipline is affected through a gamut of 
proceedings separate and distinct from a court-martial. This Note reviews the 
incorporation of Miranda and Kastigar to reveal how appropriating civilian common 
law, which was intended for the courtroom, may inadvertently decrease a 
servicemember’s procedural protection in other fora. 
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013; B.A., Stanford University, 
2004. I would like to thank Dean Elizabeth Hillman for her guidance and supervision throughout this 
project. 
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Introduction 
Drawdowns in military force, like the one in which the United 
States is currently engaged,1 have historically meant that “those Soldiers 
with discipline problems will disappear from the ranks.”2 When the 
uniformed services must reduce their workforce at a higher rate than 
established departure mechanisms—such as retirement and dismissal-
provide—the first step is often to identify and discharge those individuals 
who have already run afoul of the military justice system.3 
 
 1. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta to Offer Budget Strategy Cutting Military, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 3, 2012, at A1. 
 2. David San Miguel, Army Drawdown Forces Tightening of Retention Standards, U.S. Army (Apr. 
4, 2012), http://www.army.mil/article/77210/Army_drawdown_forces_tightening_of_retention_standards; 
see Major David S. Franke, U.S. Army, Administrative Separation from the Military: A Due Process 
Analysis, 1990 Army Law. 11, 11 (“Since you can’t keep every single individual, it will be those who 
have the best qualities, those who have the best records who stay on.” (quoting Brigadier General 
Sheridan G. Cadoria, U.S. Army, Stars & Stripes, Mar. 21, 1990, at 1 col. 1)). 
 3. When reviewing the records of personnel in overmanned specialties, enlisted retention boards 
consider “nonjudicial or more severe punishment.” Erik Slavin, Navy Unlikely to Convene Another 
Enlisted Retention Board, Stars & Stripes, Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-
unlikely-to-convene-another-enlisted-retention-board-1.166121. 
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Military justice extends beyond the familiar drama of a court-
martial to encompass less formal proceedings, like nonjudicial 
punishment4 and administrative separations.5 Both of the latter represent 
the military’s ability to maintain a disciplined force without subjecting all 
servicemembers to potential federal convictions via courts-martial. But 
although thousands of servicemembers are administratively separated for 
misconduct every year,6 these numbers are still insufficient to meet the 
requisite reduction in force size.7 Thus those servicemembers who faced 
nonjudicial punishment or administrative separation, but who were 
retained, may be involuntarily separated from their careers years or even 
decades after their disciplinary proceedings. 
Although military justice is governed by congressional statute and 
judicial common law, this Note argues military courts have been too 
quick to renounce legislative guidance in favor of adopting civilian 
decisional law.8 Such indiscriminate incorporation ignores fundamental 
differences between military and civilian law as well as the congressional 
intent behind military justice’s statutory foundation, the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).9 This Note focuses on one particular 
aspect of the UCMJ, the Article 3110 freedom from self-incrimination, to 
demonstrate how wholesale adoption of civilian courts’ jurisprudence 
may significantly deprive military personnel of the intentionally broad 
protections that Congress established. Incorporating Article III judicial 
constructs ignores some of the core aspects of Congress’ intent behind 
the Article I system. “Specifically, article 31(a) extended the traditional 
 
 4. “Nonjudicial punishment provides commanders with an essential and prompt means of 
maintaining good order and discipline and also promotes positive behavior changes in servicemembers 
without the stigma of a court-martial conviction.” Manual for Courts-Martial United States V-1 
(2008 ed.). 
 5. “Navy policy is to promote readiness by maintaining high standards of conduct and 
performance.” Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-010: Administration 
Separation (ADSEP) Policy and General Information (Sept. 20, 2011). Administrative Separations 
do so by discharging servicemembers prior to the end of their contracts. 
 6. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 2, at 11 n.2 (noting that the Army itself discharged just shy of 
9000 soldiers in 1989 for misconduct). 
 7. In the face of insufficient personnel turnover through normal procedures, the Navy chose to 
involuntarily separate 3000 sailors to help balance the budget. Matthew M. Burke, Navy Separation 
Process Leaves Sailors in the Dark, Stars & Stripes, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/navy-
separation-process-leaves-sailors-in-the-dark-1.167923. 
 8. This may be in part because “the Supreme Court has repeatedly cut back on military 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the court-martial provides an inferior forum for the protection of 
constitutional rights.” Edward F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 Yale L.J. 
1398, 1399–400 (1973). 
 9. See Douglass Calidas, Sensitive Military “Intelligence”: Reconsidering Fifth Amendment 
Waivers, 19 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 133, 145 (2008) (noting that the UCMJ is the “statutory basis” 
for military law). In its current form, the UCMJ begins at 10 U.S.C. § 801. 
 10. Throughout this Note, UCMJ articles are followed by a number, while articles of the U.S. 
Constitution are followed by a roman numeral. 
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application of the right against self-incrimination from criminal trials to 
all persons under all circumstances.”11 
This Note argues that Article 31’s “universal” application should 
extend to informal disciplinary and administrative proceedings that can 
result in many of the same punitive consequences as a court-martial: loss 
of employment, revocation of veterans’ benefits, diminished future 
employment opportunities, forfeiture of retirement pay, and lingering 
stigma.12 The due process requirements of nonjudicial punishment and 
administrative separations, although always relevant, come into 
particular focus as the uniformed branches face pressure to reduce their 
personnel by the thousands. Servicemembers who were unfairly 
incriminated by their compelled testimony earlier in their careers may be 
subjected to such statements again during the current drawdown. 
This Note examines the extent to which other sources of law, 
including Supreme Court jurisprudence, should inform or limit the 
explicit protections granted by the UCMJ in non-courtroom settings. 
Part I reviews the various forms of military justice and presents a 
hypothetical situation to bring the nuances into sharper relief. Part II 
explores the military right against self-incrimination and contrasts that 
protection against the civilian equivalent. Part III similarly describes the 
parallel development of testimonial immunity in both military and civilian 
law. Part IV discusses a servicemember’s property interests and whether 
military justice adequately protects those interests. This Note concludes 
that judiciary developments would likely allow “immunized” testimony to 
be used against a servicemember in nonjudicial proceedings and 
administrative separations. This result runs afoul of the intent behind the 
UCMJ and extends civilian jurisprudence from the realm of the courtroom 
into the realm of military discipline.  
I.  Military Justice Is a Spectrum 
American military justice is often characterized by its differences 
from other federal and state judicial systems.13 The rationales for a 
distinct military justice system tend to focus on the armed forces as a 
separate segment of the population, a subculture with its own norms and 
goals predicated on different values and expectations.14 “In every respect 
 
 11. Captain Manuel E.F. Supervielle, U.S. Army, Article 31(b): Who Should Be Required to Give 
Warnings?, 123 Mil. L. Rev. 151, 186 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. See infra notes 112–118 and accompanying text. 
 13. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (“Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence 
which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.”). 
 14. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) (“Just as military society has been a society apart from 
civilian society, so ‘[m]ilitary law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which 
governs in our federal judicial establishment.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Burns, 346 U.S. at 140)). 
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the military is, as [the Supreme Court] has recognized, a specialized 
society.”15 
The protections servicemembers enjoy vary by the source of law and 
forum. Congress codified many protections for both investigations and 
disciplinary procedures in the UCMJ. However, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”), the American military’s 
highest court, expounded upon these protections by developing its own 
jurisprudence and incorporating Supreme Court precedent. Yet the 
majority of the procedural rights only apply to courts-martial or 
procedures leading to a court-martial. The extent to which the Bill of 
Rights applies—and to what proceedings—also varies.16 The Fifth 
Amendment explicitly states that servicemembers are not entitled to an 
indictment by Grand Jury for “cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”17 
Some scholars interpret this caveat as qualifying the entire Bill of Rights 
for military personnel.18 As historian Jonathan Lurie noted, “one is 
struck by the consistency with which the Court pays lip service to its 
position that the Bill of Rights applies to the armed services, even as, 
with equal consistency, it rejects applicability in each instance.”19 At the 
same time, courts continue to debate the formal status of some tiers of 
court-martial, further obscuring when and what protections may apply.20 
In perhaps its most recognizable analog to civilian law, military 
justice can be administered via courts-martial, of which there are three 
types: general, special, and summary. The most severe is the general 
courts-martial, which—unless otherwise agreed to by the defense—
consists of a military judge and at least five “members.”21 Members 
function as fact finders, equivalent to jurors. Yet unlike their civilian 
counterparts, members are not selected from an array of the defendant’s 
 
 15. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–91 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Jonathan Lurie, Military Justice Fifty Years After Nuremberg: Some Reflections on Appearance v. 
Reality, 149 Mil. L. Rev. 189, 191 (1995). 
 17. U.S. Const. amend V. 
 18. Eugene R. Fidell, Elizabeth L. Hillman & Dwight H. Sullivan, Military Justice Cases and 
Materials 861 (2007) (“Yet a non-capital general court-martial can have as few as five members, and the 
vote of four of those five would be sufficient to convict the accused. The courts have thus far been hostile 
to legal challenges attempting to apply the civilian case law governing jury size and voting requirements to 
the military justice system.”); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Within the scope of appropriate construction, the phrase ‘except in cases arising in the land or naval 
Forces’ has been assumed also to modify the guaranties of speedy and public trial by jury.”); United 
States v. Smith 27 M.J. 242, 248 (C.A.A.F. 1988) (“[T]he right to trial by jury has no application to the 
appointment of members of courts-martial.” (citations omitted)). But see United States v. Roland, 50 M.J. 
66, 68 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (stating that, while the military defendant does not enjoy a Sixth Amendment right 
to a trial by “impartial jury,” he or she does have a right to “members who are fair and impartial” 
(citations omitted)). 
 19. Lurie, supra note 16, at 193. 
 20. See infra notes 31–32. 
 21. 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2012). 
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peers, but are instead chosen from those who “are best qualified to 
render judgment by reason of age, education, training, experience, length 
of service, and judicial temperament.”22 In part, this is because a “court-
martial panel has a much broader function than a civilian jury. . . . A 
court-martial panel is empowered not only to impose the typical criminal 
law punishments of confinement and fines, but also to adjudge a sentence 
that affects an individual’s military status.”23 A general court-martial has 
jurisdiction over any offense within the UCMJ as well as the laws of war; 
it is also the only court-martial that may confer a dishonorable discharge 
or capital punishment.24 
In contrast, the special court-martial exercises jurisdiction over 
noncapital offenses of the UCMJ25 and, unless otherwise agreed, consists 
of a judge and three members.26 Special courts-martial also have 
significant limitations on the extent of punishments they may award.27 
The least formal court-martial is the summary court-martial, which is 
reviewed by a single commissioned officer instead of a judge.28 A 
summary court-martial does not have personal jurisdiction over an 
officer or officer in training, does not possess subject matter jurisdiction 
over capital offenses, and is severely limited in the punishments it may 
award.29 In essence, the “summary court-martial occupies a position 
between informal nonjudicial disposition under [UCMJ] Art. 15 and the 
courtroom-type procedure of the general and special courts-martial.”30 
Although listed as a court-martial under the UCMJ, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that summary courts-martial do not rise to the level of “a 
‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of [the Sixth] Amendment.”31 
By the very wording of the Bill of Rights, significant protections are 
generally excepted for servicemembers at all courts-martial.32 
Conversely, Article 15 empowers military commanders to quickly 
discipline their subordinates without the need to convene a court-
martial.33 This “nonjudicial punishment” does not result in a federal 
conviction as a court-martial does, but commanding officers are still 
 
 22. Id. § 825. 
 23. Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J. 438, 455 (C.A.A.F. 1998). 
 24. 10 U.S.C. § 817. 
 25. Id. § 819. 
 26. Id. § 816. 
 27. Id. § 819. Among other limitations, a special court-martial may not award death, dishonorable 
discharge, dismissal, or confinement for more than one year. Id. 
 28. Id. § 816. 
 29. Id. § 820. 
 30. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976). 
 31. Id. at 51. 
 32. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1957) (Frankfurter J., concurring) (“Within the scope of 
appropriate construction, the phrase ‘except in cases arising in the land or naval Forces’ has been 
assumed also to modify the guaranties of speedy and public trial by jury.”). 
 33. 10 U.S.C. § 815. 
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authorized to restrict subordinates to their quarters, order a forfeiture of 
pay, and if the subordinate is not an officer, assign extra duties and 
potentially reduce the servicemember to a lower paygrade.34 In addition, 
specific offenses within the UCMJ35 may require initiation of an 
administrative separation,36 where a servicemember is evaluated for 
discharge from military service prior to the end of their contract. In some 
circumstances, the nonjudicial punishment itself may precipitate an 
administrative separation by demonstrating a “pattern of misconduct.”37 
Courts have routinely held that these administrative procedures 
satisfy the due process requirement that attaches to a public employee’s 
property interest in her employment.38 While each service possesses its 
own instructions and mechanisms for administrative separations, they are 
similar in many respects.39 This Note focuses on the Navy’s procedures in 
order to explore Article 15’s nuance of personnel “attached to or 
embarked in a vessel,” which enables a servicemember to reject 
nonjudicial punishment by demanding a court-martial instead.40 By 
focusing on an instance where the servicemember may potentially shift a 
disciplinary hearing from a less formal proceeding to a more formal one, 
the legal discussion is better able to analyze how well military justice 
fulfills Congress’ intent to create a uniform code. 
In an administrative separation for either enlisted personnel or 
officers, a panel of three lay judges (all officers senior to the defendant, 
or if the defendant is enlisted and so chooses, two officers and one senior 
enlisted) hear arguments and review evidence before making three 
findings:41 (1) whether or not the servicemember committed misconduct; 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. § 912a. 
 36. Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-146: Separation by Reason 
of Misconduct—Drug Abuse (Sept. 7, 2010). 
 37. Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-140: Separation by Reason 
of Misconduct—Pattern of Misconduct (July 21, 2012). Alternatively, documentation of a 
nonjudicial punishment may lead to adverse remarks in an evaluation and contribute to a finding of 
Unsatisfactory Performance. See Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-156: 
Separation by Reason of Unsatisfactory Performance (July 5, 2012). 
 38. Franke, supra note 2, at 19–20 (explaining how defense directives fulfill the constitutional due 
process requirement). The civilian equivalent to administrative separation boards are often justified as 
possessing proficiency and permanency that a jury would not, yet military discharge boards are not 
selected for their expertise and are rarely permanent. Captain Jack Finney Lane, Jr., U.S. Army, 
Evidence and the Administrative Discharge Board, 55 Mil. L. Rev. 95, 101 (1972). 
 39. Douglass L. Custis, Due Process and Military Discharges, 57 A.B.A. J. 875, 875 (1971). Variation 
between the services exists, however, as to what burden of proof the government must meet. See Captain 
Shane Reeves, U.S. Army, The Burden of Proof in Nonjudicial Punishment: Why Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt Makes Sense, 2005 Army Law. 28, 29 n.7 (2005) (noting that the Army uses beyond a reasonable 
doubt, while the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard determine guilt by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and the Air Force does not specify a standard but encourages beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 40. 10 U.S.C. § 815. 
 41. See Dep’t of Def., No. 1332.14, Directive: Enlisted Administrative Separations (1993); 
Sec’y of the Navy Instruction 1920.6C (Dep’t of the Navy, Dec. 15, 2005) (officer procedures); 
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(2) whether such misconduct warrants separation from the Navy; and 
(3) if the panel recommends separation, what type of discharge is 
appropriate. The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.42 
There are typically three discharges, or characterizations of service, 
available at administrative separation hearings: Honorable, which 
entitles the servicemember to all of her veterans’ benefits; General 
Under Honorable Conditions, which typically results in a forfeiture of 
the GI Bill but retains most Veterans’ Affairs health benefits; and Other 
Than Honorable, which bars the servicemember from receiving many 
veterans’ benefits.43 Separation prior to retirement, no matter how close a 
servicemember may be to reaching the current twenty-year minimum of 
service, precludes receiving a military pension. “When one considers that 
the administrative proceeding is not a judicial proceeding and that the 
judicial rules of evidence have no application,” due process becomes a 
compromise between the rights of the servicemember and the interest of 
the government.44 Neither nonjudicial punishment45 nor administrative 
separations46 adhere to the military rules of evidence. 
Each military branch is more than an employer; a uniformed service 
provides housing, medical services, transportation, food, and recreational 
outlets. Military justice governs the range of these interactions, as “the 
rights of men [and women] in the armed forces must perforce be 
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty.”47 
But discipline is largely, and daily, effected through a gamut of 
proceedings, from informal reprimands to formal trials via courts-
martial.48 The purpose, and thus the consequences, of military justice can 
 
Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910: Enlisted Administrative 
Separations (Apr. 13, 2005) (enlisted procedures); see also Captain Richard J. Bednar, U.S. Army, 
Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the Armed Forces, 16 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 14–15 (1962); Franke, 
supra note 2, at 19; Captain Frederic N. Smalkin, U.S. Army, Administrative Separations: The Old 
Order Changeth, 1974 Army L. 6, 6–7 (1974). 
 42. Reeves, supra note 39. 
 43. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2013); see Bednar, supra note 41; Smalkin, supra note 41, at 7–9 (discussing 
the types of separation and distinguishing Honorable and General Under Honorable Conditions as 
non-stigmatizing, but Other Than Honorable as stigmatizing). 
 44. Major Andrew M. Egeland, Jr., U.S. Air Force, Developments in Airmen Administrative 
Separations, 19 A.F. L. Rev 166, 183–84 (1977). 
 45. “The Military Rules of Evidence . . . do not apply at nonjudicial punishment proceedings.” 
Manual for Courts-Martial United States, supra note 4, at V-4. 
 46. Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-510: Presentation of 
Evidence (July 21, 2008) (“The rules of evidence for court-martial and other judicial proceedings do 
not apply in an administrative board hearing.”). But see Naval Military Personnel Manual, 
NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-512: Rights of the Respondent (July 21, 2008) (listing rights of the 
respondent “[i]n addition to the respondent’s right to testify on his or her own behalf, subject to the 
right against self-incrimination under [Article 31(b)]”). 
 47. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). 
 48. United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 176 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“‘The purpose of military law is to 
promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security 
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be obscured by the military’s attempts to incorporate civilian/Article III 
jurisprudence wholesale. This in turn creates a schism between formal 
courts-martial and more informal forms of maintaining discipline. In 
doing so, procedures that may have the same result for a 
servicemember—such as loss in pay, liberty, employment, and 
reputation—are granted different procedural protections simply because 
some are analogous to a courtroom (the court-martial) and some are not 
(nonjudicial punishment and administrative separation). The issue is 
compounded as empirical data indicate that units stationed in combat 
zones tend to eschew courts-martial for nonjudicial punishment and use 
administrative hearings in order to achieve the same outcome.49 
Military justice involves a spectrum of disciplinary proceedings. 
Even the term “court-martial” refers to a range of proceedings spanning 
formal capital trials to hearings that are not overseen by a judge or even 
a Judge Advocate General.50 Neither nonjudicial punishments nor 
administrative separations are constrained by formal rules of evidence. 
But where a congressional statute explicitly protects servicemembers, the 
various branches should not use differences in forum to pursue a result 
that would otherwise be unavailable. In particular, the military should 
not be empowered to compel self-incriminating testimony in a court-
martial only to use those same statements to end the declarant’s career. 
A hypothetical story helps to articulate the consequences of the growing 
rift between formal and informal military proceedings. 
An enlisted sailor has been ordered to testify about a romantic 
relationship she had with a male officer at a general court-martial 
convened against the officer. Due to the difference in paygrades, their 
relationship is considered “fraternization” and violative of Article 134.51 
Because both members willingly participated in the romance, she is also 
culpable under Article 134, and her testimony would be self-
incriminating. Accordingly, she may choose to invoke either her Fifth 
Amendment or Article 31 rights against self-incrimination.52 To 
 
of the United States.’ What is reasonable and fair from the public’s perception, as well as this Court’s 
judgment as to what is reasonable and fair, would be different in the case of national security exigency or 
operational necessity.” (quoting Manual for Courts-Martial United States, supra note 4, at I-1)). 
 49. Major Franklin D. Rosenblatt, U.S. Army, Non-Deployable: The Court-Martial System in 
Combat from 2001 to 2009, 2010 Army L. 12, 21. 
 50. JAG is the general term for a military lawyer. In the Navy they provide legal assistance to 
service members, litigate courts-martial and other hearings, and support commands through 
operational law. JAGs do not necessarily specialize in any one field, and the same lawyer will 
participate in all three fields over the course of her career. Our Mission, U.S. Navy JAG Corps, 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/careers_/careers/inbrief_ourmission.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013); see 
Elizabeth Hillman, Mission Creep in Military Lawyering, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 565 (2011). 
 51. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012). The “general article” allows for the trial and punishment of “all 
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of 
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital.” Id. 
 52. See infra notes 62–78 and accompanying text. 
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overcome these rights, the general court-martial convening authority 
may grant the sailor testimonial immunity, which bars the government 
from using her immunized testimony as evidence in a later court-martial 
against her. But limiting immunity to courts-martial leaves the sailor 
vulnerable to her compelled statements in nonjudicial punishment.53 
Under such circumstances she may still be reduced in rank, restricted to 
the ship, assigned to extra duties, and forced to forfeit wages. 
Moreover, nonjudicial punishments can be sufficient cause for 
administrative separation.54 If the administrative board determines the 
sailor should be separated, she could be conferred an Other Than 
Honorable discharge55 and forfeit many veterans’ and retirement benefits 
she may be on the cusp of receiving.56 Thus despite being “immunized,” 
the sailor could still lose rank, pay, liberty, and property interests, while 
gaining a stigma that often prevents future federal employment. 
Complicating the matter, if the sailor was not attached to a vessel, under 
Article 15 she could refuse the initial nonjudicial punishment and demand 
a court-martial,57 where the testimonial immunity could be reinstated and 
thereby preclude the above chain of events.58 
Just how often such scenarios occur is difficult to measure. 
Servicemembers have an interest in keeping disciplinary hearings 
confidential, even those that led to exoneration, while a commander’s 
discretion in how to investigate and pursue a disciplinary infraction, 
“though not absolute, is extremely broad.”59 Yet there is some empirical 
evidence demonstrating that units engaged in operational commitments, 
such as combat or deployment, significantly favor more informal 
disciplinary proceedings over courts-martial.60 By choosing less formal 
forms of military justice, these commands not only reduce the resource 
strain a court-martial would impose, but also afford the servicemember 
fewer procedural safeguards. 
 
 53. See infra notes 88–96. 
 54. Naval Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-100: Reasons for 
Separation (Sept. 20, 2011). 
 55. See infra note 43. 
 56. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2012). 
 57. Manual for Courts-Martial United States, supra note 4, at V-2. 
 58. Additionally, while the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 overlap in subject, they are not 
equivalent rights, and any grant of immunity should take such differences into account. See infra notes 
62–71 and accompanying text. 
 59. Reeves, supra note 39, at 28. 
 60. Rosenblatt, supra note 49, at 13–16. 
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II.  The (Partial) Overlap of Article 31 and MIRANDA 
A. Development of the Law 
Congress first passed the current governing document for military 
justice, the UCMJ, in 1950,61 and the UCMJ became effective in 1951.62 
Thus, Article 31 and its protection against self-incrimination predated the 
Supreme Court’s landmark Miranda v. Arizona decision by fifteen years.63 
Article 31(a) states that no “person subject to this chapter may compel any 
person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to 
which may tend to incriminate him.”64 Article 31(b) mandates that 
[n]o person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any 
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without 
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him 
that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of 
which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him 
may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.65 
Justifications for Article 31 include defending the judicial process by 
admitting only trustworthy confessions and shielding suspects from 
coercion out of procedural fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment.66 
Despite Congress’s effort to simplify and codify a uniform standard 
across all of the armed forces, there has been significant litigation in 
military courts over the interpretation of Article 31’s “plain meaning.”67 
Several military courts discussed Article 31’s function as protecting 
servicemembers from the inherently compulsive atmosphere of the 
military, especially when servicemembers face criminal interrogations.68 
“The Article 31(b) warning requirement provides members of the armed 
forces with statutory assurance that the standard military requirement for 
a full and complete response to a superior’s inquiry does not apply in a 
situation when the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked.”69 
To that end, Article 31 offers broader protection than Miranda, as the 
former applies to any interrogation, regardless of whether the suspect is 
 
 61. 10 U.S.C. § 831 Historical and Revision Notes (2012). 
 62. Supervielle, supra note 11, at 163. 
 63. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Calidas, supra note 9, at 145 n.85. 
 64. 10 U.S.C. § 831. 
 65. Id. Subsection (c) protects against irrelevant and degrading questions, while subsection (d) lists 
the potentially confusing sources of compulsion: coercion, unlawful influence, and unlawful inducement. 
 66. Supervielle, supra note 11, at 162–63. 
 67. Captain John R. Morris, U.S. Army, Right Warnings in the Military: An Article 31(b) Update, 
115 Mil. L. Rev. 261, 263–64 (1987). 
 68. United States v. Swift, 53 M.J. 439, 445 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“In such an environment, a question 
from a superior or an investigator is likely to trigger a direct response without any consideration of the 
privilege against self-incrimination.”); see State v. Davis, 582 S.E.2d 289, 293 (N.C. App. 2003) (“Concerns 
about inherent compulsion are ultimately at the heart of Miranda. In the military, interrogation by a 
superior officer raises a substantial risk of inherent compulsion.”); Supervielle, supra note 11, at 178. 
 69. Swift, 53 M.J. at 445. 
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in custody or not.70 This is intentional, as the “legislative history of the 
UCMJ reveals that rights warnings in the military extended beyond the 
minimum requirements of the Constitution.”71 
Article 31’s scope also extends beyond criminal investigations and 
into the “disciplinary” realm of military life.72 Yet given the right against 
self-incrimination’s wide ambit under Article 31(a) and (b), the only 
delineated cure for improperly compelled confessions is limited to 
Article 31(d): excluding the confessions from courts-martial.73 
Congressional commentary, however, did not focus on the distinction 
between fora, but instead elaborated against whom the evidence might be 
used.74 
Despite the difference in scope between Article 31 and Miranda—as 
well as the legislative basis of Article 31 versus Miranda as a judicial 
construct—CAAF ruled that the Miranda “formulae there laid down by 
the Court are constitutional in nature” and therefore apply to 
servicemembers as well.75 Since then, and throughout their case law, 
CAAF and the respective military service appellate courts have 
examined Article 31 protections along with Miranda76 to develop the 
military standard for when a servicemember waives her distinct 
Article 31 right.77 Because the UCMJ text does not espouse a right to 
counsel during custodial questioning, CAAF’s decision to incorporate 
Miranda also requires military interrogators to apply more analysis than 
originally envisioned by Article 31. Interrogating officials must inform a 
 
 70. Id. (“The broad application of the warning requirement under Article 31 to all suspects, not 
just those who are in custody, and the statutory restriction on admissibility of unwarned statements 
reflect a decision by the post-World War II Congress.”). 
 71. See Supervielle, supra note 11, at 183. But see Captain Frederic I. Lederer, U.S. Army, Rights 
Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1976) (“Although Professor Morgan’s notes at 
Harvard Law School indicate that the actual language of Article 31 was scrutinized rather closely, 
there is little evidence that all of Article 31(a) and 31(b) was picked with specific ends in mind.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 72. Swift, 53 M.J. at 448. 
 73. 10 U.S.C. § 831(d) (2012). 
 74. Text, References, and Commentary based on the Report of the Committee on a Uniform 
Code of Military Justice to the Secretary of Defense 47 (1949) (“Subdivision (d) makes 
statements or evidence obtained in violation of the first three subdivisions inadmissible only against 
the person from whom they were obtained. This conforms with the theory that the privilege against 
self-incrimination and self-degradation is a personal one.”). 
 75. United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249, 255 (C.M.A. 1967). 
 76. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (“If the interrogation continues without the 
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.”). 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v. Mapes 59 M.J. 60 
(C.A.A.F. 2003); Swift, 53 M.J. 439; United States v. Oxfort, 44 M.J. 337 (C.A.A.F 1996); United States v. 
Medley, 33 M.J. 75 (C.M.A. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992); United States v. Sievers, 29 M.J. 72 
(C.M.A. 1989); United States v. Heyward, 22 M.J. 35 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46 
(C.M.A. 1982); Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249; United States v. Bland, 39 M.J. 921 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994). 
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servicemember of her Article 31 rights during any criminal questioning, 
and of Miranda’s additional right to counsel if the suspect is in a 
custodial interrogation.78 
Article 31 is the sort of legislative action the Supreme Court 
“encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue” in their “laudable 
search for” an effective means of balancing the individual’s right against 
efficient criminal enforcement.79 However, military courts independently 
appropriated the substantive and procedural requirements of Miranda 
for servicemembers. This approach causes concern because military 
courts are not a function of the Constitution’s judiciary power in Article 
III, but rather stem from Article I and Congress’s power to “make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”80 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has often balked at reviewing military 
jurisprudence because “the civil courts are not the agencies which must 
determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment [between 
discipline and servicemembers’ rights]. The Framers expressly entrusted 
that task to Congress.”81 CAAF should be equally hesitant to apply 
civilian jurisprudence to already legislated issues, and it has itself 
recognized that none of Article 31’s “terms indicate that Congress 
intended to permit forced self-incrimination in board proceedings any 
more than in courts-martial.”82 Given the great lengths the judiciary goes 
to interpret and enact congressional intent,83 Article I courts should be at 
least as deferential when interpreting the UCMJ. 
B. Applying a Servicemember’s Protection Against Self-
Incrimination to the Hypothetical Sailor 
Under both the Fifth Amendment and Article 31, the hypothetical 
sailor would almost certainly have a right against making self-incriminating 
remarks at court-martial. This bright line has been clouded by recent 
military cases analyzing “chain reaction[s],” where the requirement to 
report a violation is not precluded merely because it “might come back to 
bite” the defendant in the investigatory or adjudicatory processes.84 
 
 78. Lederer, supra note 67, at 10. 
 79. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 80. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see Anna C. Henning, Cong. Research Serv., No. 7-5700, Supreme 
Court Appellate Jurisdiction over Military Court Cases (2009). 
 81. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (footnote omitted). 
 82. United States v. Ruiz, 48 C.M.R. 797, 799 (C.M.A. 1974). 
 83. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 421–22 (2009). See generally Yule Kim, Cong. 
Research Serv., No. 97-589, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends (2008). 
 84. United States v. Bland, 39 M.J. 921, 924 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Medley, 33 M.J. 75 (C.M.A. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992)); see United States. v. Serianne, 
69 M.J. 8, 11 (C.A.A.F. 2010); Medley, 33 M.J. 75; see also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 
(1951) (“Requiring full disclosure of details after a witness freely testifies as to a criminating fact does 
not rest upon a further ‘waiver’ of the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
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However, it is nearly impossible for the hypothetical sailor to 
meaningfully report or testify about what she knows of fraternization 
between an officer and an enlisted sailor without implicating herself. 
Discussing an unduly familiar relationship is also the sort of inculpatory 
remark envisioned by Article 31, which did away with the convoluted 
distinction between an “admission” and “confession.”85 
While a servicemember is often obligated to report any violation of 
the UCMJ,86 personally participating in the violation has historically 
precluded the requirement to report the same offense “based on the 
members’ right against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution and Article 31.”87 Article 31’s protections 
extend to disciplinary as well as criminal investigations.88 Accordingly, 
invoking her Article 31 rights would shield the sailor from implicating 
herself at court-martial and at any investigation that may lead to a 
nonjudicial punishment or administrative separation. Courts, however, 
have tools to compel a witness’s testimony, even if the statements are self-
incriminating. 
III.  Testimonial Immunity in KASTIGAR and the UCMJ 
A.  Development of the Law 
Like Article 31’s protection against self-incrimination, the UCMJ’s 
codification of testimonial immunity preceded its civilian counterpart by 
more than a decade.89 In Kastigar v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that courts may compel testimony normally protected by the Fifth 
Amendment so long as the granted immunity is coextensive with the 
supplanted privilege.90 And similar to the aftermath of Miranda in non-
military courts, subsequent military courts incorporated the judiciary’s 
Kastigar construction when reviewing the separate, congressional grant 
of testimonial immunity91 provided by the UCMJ.92 A suspect may raise 
 
 85. Supervielle, supra note 11, at 178. 
 86. In addition to likely violating a standing order of the command, failure to report a UCMJ 
violation could at least be punished under Article 134 of the UCMJ, which criminalizes “all disorders 
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1956). 
 87. Bland, 39 M.J. at 923; see United States v. Thompson, 22 M.J. 40 (C.M.A. 1986); United States 
v. Heyward, 22 M.J. 35 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011 (1986). But see United States v. 
Sievers, 29 M.J. 72, 73 (C.M.A. 1989). 
 88. See supra notes 69–72. 
 89. United States v. Kirsch, 35 C.M.R. 56, 68 (C.M.A. 1964). 
 90. 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972). 
 91. United States v. Mapes, 59 M.J. 60, 64 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“Appellant asserted that the 
Government used evidence derived from Appellant’s immunized statement to prosecute him in 
violation of the mandate in Kastigar and a long line of cases of this Court that apply Kastigar.” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 54 (C.M.A. 1982). However, not all of the 
cautions set forth in Kastigar were followed. See United States v. Morrissette, 70 M.J. 431, 438–39 
(C.A.A.F. 2012); United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
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her Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination in “any 
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate [her] in future criminal proceedings,”93 but the 
constitutional right itself is violated “only if one has been compelled to 
be a witness against [herself] in a criminal case.”94 
Consequently, under Kastigar, grants of immunity likewise need 
only extend so far: “The power to compel testimony is limited by the 
Fifth Amendment, and . . . any grant of immunity must be co-extensive 
with the privilege.”95 Because the Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights 
are not wholly equivalent to Article 31 rights, the grant of testimonial 
immunity within the military should not be completely coterminous 
either. An equivalent grant of testimonial immunity in the armed forces 
would match Article 31’s right against self-incrimination at all times for 
all people and not be limited to only courts-martials. 
By reducing the military’s grant of testimonial immunity to civilian 
Kastigar standards, testimony that is both created by congressional statute 
and protected by broader protections than Miranda grants could be used 
in disciplinary hearings. The use of such statements at nonjudicial 
punishment may result in a direct loss of pay and retirement benefits, a 
damaging stigma and exclusion from future employment, as well as a 
personal record that will not survive review during the current drawdown 
in forces. These uses of compelled testimony are inconsistent with the 
broad mandate that a grant of immunity be “coextensive with the 
privilege.”96 
B. Applying Compelled Testimony to the Hypothetical Sailor 
Because the hypothetical sailor has a right against self-incrimination 
under both the Fifth Amendment and Article 31, she may be compelled to 
testify only with a grant of immunity coextensive with those privileges. The 
Supreme Court has held the Fifth Amendment is only violated in criminal 
trials.97 CAAF’s adoption of Kastigar means that a witness immunized 
from the use of her compelled testimony only in future courts-martial may 
be consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling, but not the intent of the 
 
 92. One particular difference, however, is that testimonial immunity in the military is not granted 
by the judge, but by the general court-martial convening authority. Manual for Courts-Martial 
United States, supra note 4, at II-6. 
 93. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425 (1984). 
 94. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003). 
 95. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254 (1983). Justice Marshall’s concurrence implies the 
immunity extends not only to bar use of compelled testimony at later trials. Id. at 264 (Marshall, T., 
concurring) (“I join the Court’s decision that a witness who has given immunized testimony may 
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege at a later proceeding in response to questions based on his 
immunized testimony.”). 
 96. Id. at 254 (majority opinion). 
 97. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770. 
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UCMJ itself. Thus under Article III jurisprudence and the language of the 
UCMJ,98 compelled testimony could be admitted in future proceedings 
such as nonjudicial punishment and administrative separations. 
Yet if the sailor was not attached to a vessel she could potentially 
demand court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment,99 at which point 
the testimonial immunity under Article 31 seems to apply again. 
However, the Supreme Court has held that summary courts-martial do 
not qualify as “criminal proceedings” within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment,100 and the least formal court-martial could be similarly 
beyond the ambit of the Fifth Amendment. If so, testimonial immunity 
may not shield the sailor from her compelled testimony—even if she 
demanded a court-martial—because Miranda and the Fifth Amendment 
do not apply in that forum. 
But a servicemember’s right against self-incrimination is neither 
simply nor completely enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. As the 
legislative history behind the UCMJ and Article 31 demonstrate, 
Congress intended to provide more than the constitutional minimum 
protection for servicemembers. Under Article 31(a), “the constitutionally 
based protection against self-incrimination expanded beyond the 
traditional forums.”101 Given the potential for nonjudicial punishment and 
administrative separation to result in many of the same deprivations as a 
criminal conviction, immunities granted to compel evidence against a 
servicemember’s Article 31 rights should apply throughout the military 
justice system—from courts-martial to nonjudicial punishment. 
Lieutenant Brent Filbert advocated for a similar standard for these 
“quasi-criminal” sanctions following the 1992 cheating scandal at the 
Naval Academy.102 Over 120 midshipmen were implicated for cheating on 
an engineering exam; two dozen of the students were eventually 
expelled.103 At least one of the expelled students “was embittered 
because he and other midshipmen who admitted to investigators that 
they cheated were recommended for expulsion, while others who lied 
about their involvement were exonerated.”104 Just as Filbert argued that 
improperly compelled testimony should be excluded from administrative 
hearings, so too should testimonial immunity extend to administrative 
 
 98. See Rosenblatt, supra note 49, at 13–16. 
 99. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 100. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 51 (1976). 
 101. Supervielle, supra note 11, at 184 n.141. 
 102. Lieutenant Brent G. Filbert, U.S. Navy, Failing the Article 31 UCMJ Test; The Role of the 
Navy Inspector General in the Investigation of the Naval Academy Cheating Scandal, 42 Naval L. Rev. 
1, 19 (1995). 
 103. Paul Valentine, Two Dozen Expelled in Naval Academy Cheating Scandal, The Tech, Apr. 
29, 1994, at 2. 
 104. Id. 
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hearings.105 “The self-incrimination right and the exclusionary remedy are 
not separable simply because the government seeks to use the . . . 
evidence at a disciplinary forum less serious than court-martial.”106 
Similarly, the right against self-incrimination and protection against 
compelled testimony should not be severed because the government 
seeks to use the evidence outside of a court-martial in a proceeding that 
has many of the same legal consequences.  
IV.  Servicemembers’ Public Employee Rights Are at Issue 
Throughout Military Justice 
The military’s capacity to affect a servicemember’s constitutionally 
protected interests does not begin and end at court-martial; both 
nonjudicial punishment and administrative separation can deprive a 
servicemember of liberty and property. Since Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth was decided in 1972, the Fourteenth Amendment has 
protected entitlements “that stem from an independent source such as 
state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”107 This begins a two-part 
analysis: (1) What entitlements rise to the level of a protected property 
interest, and (2) what process is sufficient to deprive an individual of 
those interests?108 Both civilian and military courts have examined what 
constitutes a servicemember’s property interests, but they have not 
necessarily arrived at the same conclusions.109 
A. The Full Extent of a Servicemember’s Protected Interests Have 
Not Been Litigated; Thus Article III Jurisprudence Is an 
Incomplete Standard to Adopt 
Property interests may be created and defined by statute,110 but for a 
citizen to have a property interest he “must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement 
 
 105. Filbert, supra note 102, at 28. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 108. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 
the question remains what process is due.”). 
 109. For instance, in Seaver v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 
the court held that “a substantial question exists whether [the petitioner] has a legally sufficient 
property interest” in his retirement. 998 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (D. Kan. 1998). Military courts, however, 
note that the loss of retirement benefits is often “the single most important sentencing matter to that 
accused and the sentencing authority,” United States v. Griffin, 25 M.J. 423, 424 (C.M.A. 1988), and as 
such the opportunity to provide a meaningful argument on the results of a sentence on retirement 
benefits, as well as tailored sentencing instructions on the same matter, are required. See United States 
v. Luster, 55 M.J. 67, 72 (C.A.A.F. 2001); United States v. Greaves, 46 M.J. 133, 139 (C.A.A.F. 1997). 
 110. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
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to it.”111 Veterans’ benefits, as passed by Congress under Title 38 of the 
U.S. Code, include a variety of programs, such as educational assistance,112 
housing and small business loans,113 and health care,114 some of which do 
not require a servicemember to retire to collect. Civilian courts have 
examined the relationship between servicemembers and due process 
largely under these entitlements.115 Meanwhile, CAAF explored Roth’s 
application to servicemembers’ property interests in United States v. 
Bulger.116 Bulger and its progeny focused on the effect of a court-martial 
sentence on retirement pay and veterans’ benefits.117 Together, these cases 
and other congressional statutes118 demonstrate that servicemembers are 
public employees and entitled to the same constitutional protections as 
their civilian peers. 
In some circumstances, however, servicemembers have stronger 
property interests than their civilian public employee counterparts. Under 
Roth and the Fourteenth Amendment, citizens often have additional 
property interests, such as future employment119 and personal reputation.120 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3011, 3102, 3221, 3311, 3461, 3511 (2012). 
 113. Id. § 3742. 
 114. Id. § 1711. 
 115. Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Although the Supreme Court has 
declined to address whether due process applies to Veterans’ Affairs determinations of an applicant’s 
eligibility for disability benefits we have recently held that the Due Process Clause applies to such 
proceedings.” (citations omitted)). But see Seaver v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. 
Leavenworth, Kan., 998 F. Supp. 1215, 1220 (D. Kan. 1998) (“Petitioner was allowed to present such 
evidence at his court-martial proceedings. To the extent that a dismissal affects retirement benefits 
including pay, these procedures have been held to satisfy the meaningful-opportunity-to-be-heard 
concerns of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 116. United States v. Bulger, 41 M.J. 194, 199 (C.M.A. 1994) (Sullivan, C.J., concurring). 
 117. United States v. Luster, 55 M.J. 67, 71 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“The clear import of this and related 
decisions concerning expected retirement pay is that it is a critical matter of which the members should 
be informed in certain cases before they decide to impose a punitive discharge.”); United States v. 
Greaves, 46 M.J. 133, 139 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (“[I]t is only in a theoretical sense that the effect a punitive 
discharge has on retirement benefits can be labeled collateral.” (quoting United States v. Griffin, 
25 M.J. 423, 424 (C.M.A. 1988)); United States v. Sumrall, 45 M.J. 207, 209 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“In light 
of the above, the specified issue before us is whether appellant’s court-martial denied him his 
retirement pay and other retirement benefits without due process of law.”). 
 118. The Federal Tort Claims Act specifically envisions servicemembers as government employees 
by defining “acting within the scope of his office or employment” to mean “acting in the line of duty” 
for military personnel. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2012). 
 119. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Only last year, the Court held 
that this principle ‘proscribing summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or inquiry 
required by due process’ applied.” (quoting Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971))). 
 120. Id. at 573 (“For where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because 
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). But see Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a 
tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation.”); Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (“[T]his line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart 
from more tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to 
invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” (citations omitted)); Whiting v. Univ. of S. 
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Similarly, hiring preference for former servicemembers within other 
federal agencies is guaranteed by law under Title 38 of the U.S. Code.121 
The consensus among witnesses at a congressional hearing was that 
an “undesirable discharge” attached a social and economic stigma.122 In 
1977, the Department of Defense changed the name from “undesirable 
discharge” to “Discharge under Other Than Honorable Conditions.”123 
Because most personnel leave the military with Honorable 
characterizations, even the intermediate General characterization124 can 
stigmatize a servicemember,125 yet administrative separations may 
recommend the even less favorable discharge: Other Than Honorable. 
Given that nonjudicial and administrative procedures may inflict the same 
damage to property interests as criminal proceedings,126 the minimum due 
process for non-criminal hearings may not sufficiently protect a 
servicemember’s interests, especially if other formal evidentiary 
procedures are not present.127 
B. A Servicemember’s Property Rights Are Implicated Throughout 
the Spectrum of Military Justice 
Due process mandates that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, 
and property—cannot be deprived absent constitutionally adequate 
procedures.128 The exact requirements are, in part, determined by the 
degree of deprivation itself.129 For termination of a public employee, the 
minimum is “some opportunity for the employee to present his side of 
 
Miss., 451 F.3d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 2006) (“To determine if a public employee has been deprived of a 
protected liberty interest, th[e] court must find that he was either: terminated for a reason which was 
(i) false, (ii) publicized, and (iii) stigmatizing . . . or denied other employment opportunities as a result.”). 
 121. 38 U.S.C. § 4212 (2012). 
 122. Lane, supra note 38, at 98. 
 123. Egeland, supra note 44, at 191. 
 124.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 125. Lane, supra note 38, at 55. 
 126. Although dicta in other cases indicates enlisted pay grades could potentially not be a property 
interest. “Our cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may 
grant or deny it in their discretion.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). 
Because commanding officers may individually promote junior enlisted personnel to a higher rank 
under the Command Advancement Program at their discretion, these promotions may not constitute a 
protected property interest. 
 127. Custis, supra note 39, at 875–86. 
 128. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
 129. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997) (“In determining what process is due, account 
must be taken of ‘the length’ and ‘finality of the deprivation.’” (citations omitted)); Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988) (“In determining how long a delay is justified in affording a 
post-suspension hearing and decision, it is appropriate to examine the importance of the private 
interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by the delay; the justification for the delay and its 
relation to the underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may have 
been mistaken.”). 
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the case”130 and a preliminary hearing to balance the “private interest in 
retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious 
removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative 
burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination.”131 Administrative 
separations, when properly conducted, provide the servicemember an 
opportunity to present a defense and the requisite preliminary hearing.132 
CAAF invoked Roth to hold that a court-martial fulfills a servicemember’s 
due process requirements when the trial denies him his retirement pay and 
benefits as a consequence of being separated, even if these deprivations 
were not explicitly part of the sentence.133 
While administrative separation and nonjudicial punishment results 
are appealable, the decisions are not reviewed by a court of law despite 
their capacity to deny liberty and property interests.134 This process exists 
notwithstanding some scholars’ belief that no one “reasonably advocates 
that judges should run the Army, but judges should recognize and decide 
cases involving those few protectable and necessary interests the solder 
has: his pay, his employment, and his retirement.”135 Where property and 
liberty interests can be impinged upon without the benefit of rules of 
evidence or appeal to a court of law, there should be greater procedural 
protection, not less. Accordingly, testimonial immunity should extend 
from courts-martial to disciplinary hearings, such as nonjudicial 
punishment and administrative separations. 
C. Applying Property Interest Analysis to the Hypothetical Sailor 
Determinations of guilt in nonjudicial punishments are recorded in a 
servicemember’s personal evaluation. Such records are often reviewed by 
promotion boards and when deciding a servicemember’s next assignment. 
In some jurisdictions, the negative record could impinge upon a 
servicemember’s property interests simply by being published and thereby 
imposing a stigma.136 In those jurisdictions, such intrusions are entitled to a 
 
 130. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. 
 131. Id. at 542–43; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 132. Franke, supra note 2, at 19–20. 
 133. United States v. Sumrall, 45 M.J. 207, 209 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 134. Perhaps because a “federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude 
of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies.” Bishop v. Wood, 425 U.S. 341, 349 (1976). 
Results of nonjudicial punishments may be appealed to the commanding officer’s superior. Manual for 
Courts-Martial United States, supra note 4, at V-8. The findings of an administrative separation board 
are not final themselves but must be approved. Military Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15560D, 1910-
600: Forwarding Cases to the Separation Authority (Sept. 2, 2009). 
 135. Captain Arthur Haessig, U.S. Army, The Soldier’s Right to Administrative Due Process: The 
Right to Be Heard, 63 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1974). 
 136. In applying a Washington law, the court found “a personnel document is a public record, subject 
to disclosure, if it relates to the conduct of government and to the performance of governmental 
functions.” Cox v. Roskelley, 359 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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name-clearing hearing.137 Similarly, because administrative separations 
can result in a discharge from military service and the potential loss of 
both veterans’ benefits and retirement pay, servicemembers are entitled 
to a preliminary hearing and an opportunity to present a defense. 
Nonjudicial punishment and administrative separations, in isolation, 
fulfill these requirements. 
In the previously discussed hypothetical, the convening authority 
compels the sailor to testify at a court-martial about her unduly familiar 
relationship with an officer. Her testimony, while inadmissible at a court-
martial against her, could potentially be used as evidence in both 
nonjudicial punishment and administrative separation hearings. As a 
result, the government is able to compel a witness to testify against 
herself and, by eschewing a formal court-martial, impose many of the 
same deleterious effects. By directly applying Article III developments in 
constitutional law but ignoring the congressional intent of the UCMJ itself, 
military justice enables the government to compel a witness to testify in a 
court-martial and still face the possibility of losing her protected property 
interests in her public employment, veterans’ benefits, potential retirement 
pay, and reputation. 
Whereas the Supreme Court has said the “option to lose their means 
of livelihood or pay the penalty of self-incrimination” is tantamount to 
coercion,138 here the accused is made to self-incriminate and potentially 
lose her livelihood. This is a potential consequence of military courts 
viewing testimonial immunity and Roth due process as distinct spheres 
with no overlap. However, the hypothetical demonstrates that both legal 
concepts pervade military justice. It is the cumulative effect of military 
justice procedures, and not just individual hearings, that the military 
should consider when interpreting the UCMJ and adapting civilian 
common law. 
Conclusion 
In the absence of any other instruction, military justice’s adoption of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence would not only be natural but perhaps 
required. Indeed, where military rules of evidence are similar to those 
generally recognized by civilian courts, adoption of readily available 
precedent has reduced interpretive difficulties.139 But examining 
administrative separations and nonjudicial punishment as purely 
disciplinary hearings and therefore unconnected to a servicemember’s 
rights at court-martial ignores the panoply of forms military justice adopts. 
 
 137. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Cox, 359 F.3d at 1110. 
 138. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967). 
 139. First Lieutenant Robert D. Duke, U.S. Army, Aspects of the Military Law of Confessions, 
8 Vand. L. Rev. 19, 19 (1954). 
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Because discipline is effected through a variety of mechanisms that possess 
similar potential to deprive property and liberty rights, congressionally 
legislated protections should extend throughout the military justice 
machine. And where congressional intent is clear and not unconstitutional, 
military justice should enforce the standards set forth by the legislature, 
made in accordance with Congress’ constitutional grant “To make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”140 
While in theory administrative separation and nonjudicial punishment 
meet the thresholds of due process, CAAF’s current incorporation of 
Miranda and Kastigar could permit the use of compelled testimony in 
these less formal fora of military justice. For the servicemember, this 
potentially results in a loss in paygrade, wages, employment, reputation, 
and benefits that normally accompanies a conviction by court-martial. 
Although the current policy’s cost to the servicemember is significant, 
expanding testimonial immunity to encompass nonjudicial punishment 
and administrative separation is unlikely to burden the government. This 
is because testimonial immunity can only be granted by a general court-
martial convening authority. Both the Article 32 investigation141 and pre-
trial discovery necessary for a general court-martial will likely produce 
other and significant inculpatory evidence against the declarant. 
Moreover, in most military jurisdictions culpability at a disciplinary 
hearing is determined by a preponderance of the evidence and the 
formal military rules of evidence do not apply. The proposed change only 
precludes the government from using compelled testimony against the 
declarant at her own disciplinary hearing; it does not heighten the 
evidentiary standard or preclude the other inculpatory evidence 
discovered through pretrial discovery. 
Given the deleterious consequences exposure to nonjudicial 
punishments and administrative separations has for a servicemember, 
especially in the ongoing drawdown, procedural protections should clarify 
and strengthen servicemembers’ UCMJ as well as Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has expressly allowed for such 
accommodations, as “[w]e have also recognized that the military has, 
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its 
long history.”142 In practice, extending testimonial immunity throughout 
the military justice system would likely have little impact on existing 
nonjudicial punishment and administrative separation procedures. 
Failing to do so, however, violates fundamental notions of fairness and 
blurs the constitutional separation of powers. 
 
 
 140. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 141. “No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough 
and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made.” 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1996). 
 142. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). 
